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Th' article examines some of the issues arising from the proliferation of cultural 
stu~ies as a fonn of national-identity research. ~ooking at th.e :ase of the re~ent 
rise of culture studies in South Africa, we exarmne how certam Item~ of recelv.ed 
wisdom about cultural studies have obscured som~ of the academl~ dynamics 
that have actually driven the growth of cultural studies. In. con~t w.lth some of 
these aspects we consider cultural studies as a fonn of l?qUlry, dnven by the 
reality ofits subject-matter, and review some of the nonnative c~nce~ts that go;-
em the communication of research findings. ~asc:d on C.S. Peirce s p~gmatlc 
tion of the logic of scientific commUniCation, and on pragmatiC tre.nds 
co.n~p gAfrican writers like D A Masolo and Kwasi Wiredu, we conSider ansmg amon . . . ffi al 
'ust what has become the subject-matter ofcul~ral studies. W,e ° er an terna-
{. e fonnulation based in communication practice. and provide an example of 
~:w this was presented in conference on the African Renaiss~ce . . w,e concl~de 
with suggestions about how cultural studies might recover ItS o~gl~al radical 
democratic impetus in a world where socialism has lost much of Its mtellectual 
integrity. 
In 1988, Ntongela Masile1a wrote a Preface to ~e!hinkin~ 
Culture entitled "Establishing an Intellectual Bndg~head, 
in which he pays due respect to the British derivat~ons of 
cultural studies. In addition he acknowledges ~he assistance 
they might give to establishing i~tellectual br~dge-h~ads. on 
the political terrains of South Afncan and Afncan hlstones. 
But intellectual references, he argued strongly, also need to 
come from within Africa itself. In 1988 these were few and 
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far between in South Africa. The 'nativization' of cultural 
studies in South Africa, Masilela suggested, would have to 
occur in the context of' Africanization', which he describes 
as the re-orientation of intellectual and historical perspectives 
of cultural studies in tenns of African cultural trajectories and 
history. Amongst the writers Masile1a identified as contribut-
ing to Africanization are Nadine Gordimer, Ngugi wa 
Thiong' 0, Amilcar Cabral, Frantz Fanon, Aime Cesaire, Chiek 
Anta Diop, Joseph Ki-Zerbo, Charles van Onselen and A.C. 
Jordan. Masilela is furthennore not shy to include two addi-
tional South African authors even though their racial attitudes 
were possibly suspect: amongst the "originating moment of 
the fonnation of the peculiarities of our [South African] cul-
tural studies", he states, are the writers Olive Schreiner and 
Laurens van der Post (see also Masilela, 1987). 
In many ways Masilela's entry-point into cultural studies 
mirrors the historically accepted conception of "culture" as 
some fonn of canon, text, writing or "meaning-making mecha-
nism" based on a characteristic literary fonn (or its equiva-
lent where one is absent). Indeed, it is precisely the elevation 
of subaltern message reception, use and consumption to the 
status of a worthy academic subject-matter that sets apart the 
early "founding fathers" of cultural studies in Britain, Rich-
ard Hoggart, Edward P. Thompson and Raymond Williams. 
Clearly, therefore, it would appear that a similar maneuver 
applied to African and other globally subaltern fonns of mes-
sage reception and consumption would be sufficient to 
"nativize" cultural studies, weaning it away from its purported 
"Britishness". This may have worked to some extent in 
Anglophone environments like the United States, or Austra-
lia. But the simple transposition of the approach to the for-
merly subaltern peoples of the London Imperium has' created 
some problems in the translation. 
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How does the "Britishness" that is perceived as the sub-
ject-matter of early cultural studies translate into the "Carib-
bean-ness" or "Indian-ness" and so on of the old empire's 
former territories? Indeed; one can look upon the concept of 
"culture" as itself rooted in the problems and solutions spe-
cific to the spiritual, intellectual, and material environments 
of the historical nations of Western Europe. On this reading, 
one should then consider constituting the study of the spiri-
tual, intellectual, and material environments of African, Asian 
and other peoples as being the study of something other than 
Europe's notion of "culture". However, this places the very 
concept of a concept in some doubt, because essentializing 
some conceptual object in this way suggests that there are 
equally essential distinctions at the root of the human condi-
tion. It is a very short step from this to supporting the claim 
that peoples are different in a Kiplingesque way that leaves 
East as East and West as West with the twain never meeting. 
Obviously people do differ in their physical or incarnate char-
acters, but there is simply no evidence with any scientific 
validity to make this kind of claim worth making in the first 
place. 
Where do we then go with the concept of culture such that 
it becomes possible to make sense globally with the concep-
tion of culturaf studies? Our previous work has often stressed 
the trajectories of South African cultural studies as a local 
phenomenon, at the expense of trying to understand just why 
in the contemporary global environment the field has devel-
oped the way it has. The institutional starting point was with 
the journal Critical Arts in 1980, which has undergone a few 
metamorphoses in its time (see Tomaselli & Shepperson, 
2000), finally settling down at the Contemporary Cultural 
Studies Unit CCSU at Natal University. Changes in the po-
litical environment have permitted the field to take on a dif-
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ferent role to its initial focus on anti-apartheid activism as 
popular culture, to seeking ways in which to engage criti-
cally with the forces of transformation that these changes had 
been expected to set in motion. The same processes have 
brought about more open relations with scholars in Africa, 
leading us to consider what sort of relevance cultural studies, 
as we have practiced in the field, has for the broader African 
developmental and intellectual environment (Tomaselli, 
1998). Although these developments have led to the devel-
opment of a variety of more or less fruitful linkages and af-
filiations to develop, global developments have tended to 
enforce a shift of focus away from previously accepted ways 
of viewing the actual object of cultural studies practice. 
In this article we want to look at cultural studies as a form 
of inquiry based on the reality of some subject-matter, and 
the intellectual status thereof as being founded in the capac-
ity for practitioners to communicate meaningfully about this 
subject-matter across a globally variegated range of spiritual, 
intellectual and material environments. First, however, we 
will take a brief look at some of the issues that have arisen 
from the initial engagement of cultural studies with Africa, 
taking special note of the kinds of discourses that have arisen 
between African philosophers and those practicing philoso-
phy in Africa (Mudimbe, 1989; Masolo, 1994). We do this 
because of a number of highly influential standpoints that 
have developed within the African diaspora and among schol-
ars in southern Africa (see Critical Arts, Volume 1999a, 
1999b). One is the early work ofPlacide Tempels (1958) and 
his critics and followers (Mbiti, 1969; Kagame, 1956; Shutte, 
1993). Another is the socialist-semiological work of philo so-
phers who derive their work from structuralist and post-struc-
turalist sources, the former including Paulin Hountondji 
(1983), the latter with a higher profile drawing on Valentin 
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Mudimbe (1989). Finally, there is a diverse branch that fo-
cuses on indigenous language "sagacity," more or less mesh-
ing the other two strands (Jahn, 1961; Hebga, 1982). 
Our conclusion will be fhat although the early work of 
Tempels and his followers has had some influence on the 
rather Kiplingesque forms of Pan-Africanist thought, espe-
cially in the diaspora, its essentially scholastic underpinnings 
permit a somewhat more realist approach to culture to de-
velop. Later writers like Augustine Shutte (1993) also pro-
mote an essentially neo-scholastic approach, based generally 
in the Thomist tradition. We will suggest a shift of emphasis 
from the Thomist to the Scotist, basing our approach on C.S. 
Peirce's inquiry as a form of community practice, defined by 
its communicational norms, which in turn are based in the 
reality of the discipline's subject-matter. On this basis we will 
make some suggestions about what might validly constitute 
the subject-matter of cultural studies. Our conclusion it that 
this is the special forms of communication that arise with in-
quiry into the "co-existence of persistence and change" (Wil-
liams, 1973, p. 347) in communities' spiritual, intellectual 
and material conduct of life as people locally and globally 
negotiate their relationships with new generations. 
Culture: The Confusion of Concept, 
History, and Theory 
• 
Recent South African academic practice, emphasizing the 
hermeneutic-anthropological tradition stemming from writ-
ers like Clifford Geertz (1973), has to some extent circum-
vented the well-developed introversion of other cultural stud-
ies variants, by taking for itself the mantle of "South African 
Culture Studies" (Nuttall & Michael, 2000). In effect, this 
naming obviates the tendency for particular academic envi-
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ronments to inherit the evolution of original cultural studies 
into a form of "critical British studies" (Higgins, 1999). Thus 
in Australia cultural studies has more and more delved into 
"post-coloniality" and "antipodean identity" to distinguish 
itself from the perception that their cultural studies is but a 
variation on the themes published by the Birmingham Cen-
ter, Open University, Westminster University and many oth-
ers in the UK. South African scholars are aware of this. In 
his ground-breaking study of Raymond Williams, John 
Higgins (1999) notes how Williams was aware of the basis of 
his scholarship in British (and especially English) concerns, 
not the least being just what distinguished "being-British" 
from "being-English". This has been equally found in the 
cultural studies tradition, but with the additional problem of . 
how to constitute such kinds of identity-predicates after the 
Cold War. There is a far greater permeability of political, eco-
nomic and infrastructural borders as globalized capital has 
gained the ascendancy, which has loosened many of the ties 
that previously bound not only individuals, but also corpora-
tions and commodities, to specific territories and the associ-
ated languages, currencies, industrial standards and employ-
ment practices (amongst other factors). 
All these have a basic historical character rooted in indi-
vidual national bodies, and the concept of culture originally 
evolved as a solution to the strains that such factors brought 
as they changed earlier agricultural or agrarian, often feud:!l 
or customary, relations in those territories. In the case of South 
African "culture studies" there is some awareness of this, but 
to be aware of something is not quite the same as factoring it 
into the broader social and political environment that consti-
tutes "South Africa" under these conditions. One example 
worth examining in detail here is Robert Thornton's (2000) 
introduction to the cultural studies appropriation of the con-
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cept of culture, composed as an introduction for a reader in 
culture studies. Thornton lays out the ways in which cultural 
studies in general (meaning British cultural studies) has built 
on the senses in which different periods and disciplines have 
mobilized the concept of culture. He relates the various ap-
propriations of the concept to what he considers to be the 
base formulation, that of Edward Tylor in 1873 (Thornton, 
2000, pp. 35-38). 
One leg of Thornton's approach to culture is therefore to 
see it as "the collection of customs, traditions, unwritten laws, 
and lifeways of all of humanity in all its cultural variants" 
(2000, p. 37). The other leg is based in those forms of cul-
tural writing that form the origins of or are susceptible to re-
articulation under the concept of "discourse." These essen-
tially derive from the ideas of national genius embodied in 
the individual, based on the work of the Romantic Poets: 
Wordsworth and Coleridge in England, and Goethe in Ger-
many (Thornton, 2000, pp. 37-38). 
For Thornton, the concept of culture as such comes onto 
the scene only with Tylor's work, although its origins lie in 
the roots of western philosophical thought, in the "ironic be-
lief that all cultural and social reality is always just what it is 
but also always somehow other than it seems" (2000, p. 34). 
However, the first concrete conceptual components of cul-
tural theory only develop after the Westphalian settlement 
(1648), as writers like Adam Smith and the French physiocrats 
began to elaborate theories of political economy to explain 
the wealth of nations in terms that do not rely on divine inter-
vention (Thornton, 2000, pp. 34-35). The upshot of this is 
that the concept of culture emerges alongside theories pro-
posed to explain wealth and power in terms offorces that are 
independent, but that the institutions that govern them are 
constructed within relations of power that are historical or 
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contingent (Thornton, 2000, p. 35). Culture, in short, is based 
on the national idea, with all the historical and political bag-
gage that has grown with the idea as it has been appropriated 
in the aftennath of the modem imperial period. In tenns of 
the actual theorists that influenced the intellectual discourse 
within which cultural studies developed, Thornton (2000, p. 
38) cites Malinowski and Foucault as being decisive, with 
their common inspiration in the thought of Friedrich 
Nietzsche: 
Malinowski wrote about culture in non~ Western small-scale societies, and 
Foucault wrote about modern European society. They agree that language 
and cultural action of all types are intrinsic to social power, and that social 
power exists not only in the office of kings and the bureaucrats of the state, 
but rather (sic) in the minutiae of everyday life, especially in ritual, custom, 
and practices of the ordinary. Nietzsche had shown, in his trenchant critique 
ofEuTopean morality, sexuality, art, music, and language that social power 
is to be found in the conventions oftheir everyday existence, in that they were 
taken for granted in their businesses, churches and entertainment. Nietzsche 
was, emphatically, not a sociologist or observer of anyone's daily existence, 
but his insight into the cultural framework of compulsion, desire and power is 
perhaps the most powerful set of ideas of their time, untimely as they were. 
The focus of cultural studies today is still precisely where scholars such as 
Nietzsche, Malinowski, or Foucault directed it: on the culture of the popular, 
the ordinary, the everyday, and the 'nonnal', and it seeks to show how these 
practices discipline or shape our existence (Thornton, 2000, p. 29). 
With the growing recognition that the concept of the na-
tion is deeply flawed, so some like Raymond Williams, to-
ward the end of his life, began to suspect that culture, base'tl 
in the emergence of the national idea, was also flawed. Yet 
cultural studies has, as Thornton (2000, p. 40) notes, contin-
ued to consider culture, as the complex of power relations 
that shape the ordinary and the popular, as an orientive idea 
for explicating not only meanings, but also the contestation 
of meanings "related to each other in a complex manifold of 
meanings and values that is relatively independent of their 
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temporal sequence." Given, though, that the original cultural 
studies project, the Birmingham Center for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies (BCCCS), was based in the evolutionary and 
materialist Marxist tradition, Thornton (2000, p. 41) acknowl-
edges that the twenty-first century's version of cultural stud-
ies has become essentially static and ahistorical. The dissolu-
tion of the national idea has, as Thornton puts it (2000, p. 
42), left in its place "much wider, but also much more nebu-
lous, notions of' culture' and 'discourse. ", Earlier tendencies 
to view cultures as Malinowskian bounded wholes leading to 
political tendencies like Nazism, apartheid, and Lenin's na-
tionalities policy, have led to such notions of culture becom-
ing anathema to many (Thornton, 2000, pp. 39-42). 
But cultural studies still persists with the study of differ- . 
ences, often at the expense of inequalities between class and , 
gender groupings, This is justified on the grounds that cul- ' 
ture is as much a creative as it is a coercive force, riddled '. 
with cognate paradoxes of the bounded and the dissolved 
boundary, the stable and the fluid, and so on (Thornton, 2000, 
pp. 43-44). To some extent, this can be offset by stressing the' 
coincidence of cultural studies' lack of conceptual grounding' 
with the parallel lack of political, economic and social an-
chors so noticeable in post-ideological political and economic 
development. Thornton does not make any specific endorse- ' 
ment of these developments, although he does note the "in-
dispensability" of these indeterminacies in making-sense of 
hybridity and diasporic consciousness in displaced commu-' 
nities. However this does not quite dispel Thornton's further,' 
acknowledgment that perhaps Raymond Williams may have " 
been right when, late in life, he expressed the fear that cul-: 
tural studies had become a: 
... vague and baggy monster, ... but we can define it more closely, as 
studies, community sociology, popular fiction or popular music ... Yet I 
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wonder about the [academic] courses where at least the teachers, and I would 
say also the students, have not encountered the problems of the ... tension 
between that social history of forms and these forms in contemporary situa-
tions with their new and partly old content (Williams, 1989, pp. 158-159, 
cited in Thornton, 2000, p. 46). -
This late concern of Williams echoes his earlier (1973, p. 
347) characterization of the recurring themes of country and 
city in English literature as a parallel concern with attempts 
to reconcile what he called "the permanent tension between 
persistence and change" in the trajectories of modern indus-
trial social experience. Indeed, that which persists, as in some 
kind of quasi- or pseudo-Romantic 'genius' in early cultural 
theory, cannot be dismissed merely on the grounds that what 
one says in language about this is merely the contingent or 
arbitrary relation of signifier to signified. Aside from some 
rather corny mistakes in the details of cultural studies' ori-
gins, Thornton misses some rather more cogent factors in the 
philosophical origins of cultural studies. We will deal with 
the latter, for example, Thornton's wholesale exclusion ofthe 
alternatives possible in the scholastic realism that modern 
philosophy has rejected in favor of a whole raft of nominal is-
tic "vague and baggy monsters" of which Nietzsche and his 
followers are but one relatively minor trend later, for the 
present drawing attention to a few things that betray a per-
haps too hasty approach to the job of producing his chapter. 
In the first instance, although Thornton is himself a noted 
anthropologist, he fails to mention the influence of Alfred 
Kroeber and Talcott Parsons (1958). These two, an anthro-
pologist and sociologist respectively, made the crucial and 
decisive conceptual decision that 'culture' was to refer not to 
any of the subject-matter of sociology. The important point 
here is that their "concordat" (Harris, 1979, p. 280) effec-
tively removed from the notion of culture any reference to 
material or behavioral vectors. These, which were central to 
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Tylor's earlier definitions, Kroeber and Parsons decided were 
proper to the subject-matter of sociology (Harris, 1979, pp. 
281-282). They further suggested that: , 
... it is useful to define the concept of culture for most usages more narrowly 
than has been the case in the American anthropological tradition, restricting 
its reference to transmitted and created content and patterns of values, ideas, 
and other symbolic-meaningful systems as factors in the shaping of human 
behavior and the artifacts produced through behavior (cited in Harris, 1979, 
p.281). 
Effectively, the limitation of the subject-matter of cultural 
anthropology to the mental or idealistic dimension flew in 
the face ofTylor's original formulations. Tylor had originally 
written that to study culture is to examine the "complex whole 
which includes knowledge, belief, habit, art, law, morals, 
custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man 
as a member of society" (cited in Harris, 1979, pp. 278-279). 
Tylor saw the tools and artifacts, and the way that societies 
used them, as central to the cultural make-up of these societ-
ies, collecting and studying "hand shuttles, crossbows, 
blowguns, drills, screws, water wheels, and other instruments, 
tools and weapons" (Harris, 1979, p. 279). Thus Raymond 
Williams' focus on the material as well as the symbolic in a 
whole way oflife was hardly as out of date in 1958 as Thornton : 
(2000, p. 38) has indicated. 
Secondly, Thornton (2000, p. 36) dates cultural studies as , 
a "named movement" from the time that Stuart Half (1981) 
merged the culturalism of the "leftist historians E.P. Thomp- . 
son, Richard Hoggart and Raymond Williams" with the: 
"modified Marxism of Antonio Gramsci" and adding the 
"third paradigm" of Foucault's powerlknowledge discourse 
theories. This is simplistic, if not downright wrong. Firstly, 
the only historian among the three he names was Thompson; 
both Hoggart and Williams were literary scholars by train-
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ing, even if their working class origins may have inclined 
them politically toward the historical methods of Marxism. 
At the time of cultural studies' "naming", only Hoggart was a 
career academic, both Williams 'and Thompson being active 
in the adult education sphere (Williams accepting a profes-
sorship at Cambridge only after Hoggart's rise to prominence 
with the establishment of the Birmingham Center). Thus 
Thornton's fwther claim (2000, p. 35) that "cultural studies 
first took shape around the work of a group of British Marx-
ist sociologists" fwther ignores the facts and contradicts his 
other statements. It is a matter of record that the "group of 
Marxist sociologists" of the BCCCS was comprised of social 
anthropologists, literary scholars, historians and a variety of 
other practitioners. All were in a sense united under Hoggart's 
vision of what the meshing of disciplines could achieve in 
elevating the methods of criticism to that of scientifically valid 
inquiry. This leads to a further lack of attention to detail, which 
in even a short piece like the chapter under consideration here 
should have been acknowledged: the fact that Williams be-
gan his sustained and critical confrontation with the language 
of' culture' right after his return from service in World War 
II. By the time his first independent monograph, Culture and 
Society appeared in 1958, Williams had thus spent a decade 
of research on the concept in the literary and critical canons. 
It was simply the accident of Hoggart's Uses a/Literacy ap-
pearing a year before in 1957 that led many to see both "as 
contributing to what only much later even began to take on 
the appearance of an autonomous intellectual movement. 
Williams certainly was never consciously engaged with 'es-
tablishing' cultural studies, and indeed only met personally 
with Hoggart after obtaining tenure: both were unlikely to be 
invited to appear at the same conference because Williams 
was not in the academic loop until much later (see Jones, 
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1994, p. 394). 
What our focus on these apparently minor issues is intended 
to show is that for all intents and purposes the South African 
"culture studies" tendency has not gone beyond the by-now 
canonical genealogy of cultural studies in British academic· 
circles that is itself a truncated and much-abridged represen- . 
tation. As early as 1998, the US-based Kenyan scholar Hana,:1 
Wright unearthed a considerable body of cultural work 
follows the trends Thornton ascribes to the 1980s and 
that had been going on in diverse places long before the 
tablishment ofBCCCS. It is hard to understand why 
obviously commissioned to provide the theoretical 
ground for the collection in which his chapter appears"" , .... _. 
& Michael, 2000), failed to incorporate these de\leic)pnlenlts. 
Almost all ofthem were already established before the 
ture studies in South Africa' movement began, and had 
deed been cited in other work (Tomaselli, 1998; Tomaselli 
Shepperson, 2000; Shepperson, 1997). Yet the tendency 
partial reference to historical developments is not just a 
lem with cultural studies: in the next section we will look 
some appropriations of philosophy in Africa in which 
are similar exclusions. 
Appropriation or Indigenization? 
Africa Looking at the West Looking at Africa 
• 
Some people have wondered whether W,:st(:rn-ecluc,at 
Africans (whether educated in the West or at \X"'ot,>rn_n 
ented African universities) have sometimes championed 
cause of Western perspectives better than Westerners 
selves might have done (Makgoba, 1997). With some 
tions, discussion with a cultural studies orientation, especi: 
in South Africa, tends to be conducted almost excolu!:h 
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within frames unproblematically imported from French, Brit-
ish or U.S. approaches, while nevertheress claiming an Afri-
can emphasis in the titles of such books and articles (Van 
Staden, 1996; see also Shepperson, 1997). Another import is 
the American notion of intercultural communication, where 
there is at least an attempt at theoretical indigenization. How-
ever, appropriations of this paradigm must address two cru-
cial issues that are part of the background to its earlier de-
ployments: a) South African intercultural theory which dur-
ing apartheid placed white Afrikaners on the inside and ev-
eryone else on the outside (Tomaselli 1992); and b) the rather 
superficial attempts to universalize and mobilize concepts like 
the Zulu code of conduct, Ubuntu ('I am because we are'), to 
renegotiate the inside-outside equation from the Afrikaner 
Other to an African Same. The effect in both cases is to le-
gitimize the ideologies of business: during apartheid in terms 
of black-white labor relations; and in the post-apartheid era 
in terms of a psychological search for multi-cultural belong-
ing, social, business and labor harmony (Steyn & Motshabi, 
1996; Ngidi, 1997). 
In its extreme form, the indigenization argument maintains 
that theories and approaches developed at the metropoles are 
irrelevant for Africa. This critique is, in many respects, hard 
to refute. This is because theory, like other forms of writing, 
has intimate relations not only with the language in which it 
is written, but also with the particular structures and struggles 
of societies. This argument, however, under-estimates the 
extent to which many African nations are modern capitalist 
states, and the extent and degrees to which they have moved 
along the path of modernity (Muller & Tomaselli, 1990, p. 302). 
Cultural studies in Africa begins with the criticism of an 
image of Africa developed historically over 400+ years of 
interaction (Pieterse, 1992). Not only is this a "western" im-
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age, as Pieterse and others show (for example Mudimbe, 1989, 
and Hickey & Wylie, 1993); it also finds currency in African , 
thought. Africanist thinkers in the diaspora tend to hold, on 
the other hand, that any image of Africa is a purely European 
construct (Mudimbe, 1989). This has given rise to some Afri-
can scholars and politicians resenting their status as Other, 
encouraging the construction of an alter ego - an essentialist 
identity developed in opposition to exploitation by the West-
ern Same. But does the long colonial relationship consist 
purely of a relation of exploitation? The record shows that 
many kinds of relationship, ranging from paternalism, through 
cultural cross-pollination, adaption, and assimilation to ex-
clusion and segregation, became strategies of interaction 
adopted within different spheres at different times. Sometimes 
one of these has been a major imperial strategy, as the ex-
ample of assimilation shows in the existence oflinguistically-
defined Francophone, Arabophone, Anglophone and 
Lusophone regions etc. Essentialist analytical frameworks 
bracket outthe 'surplus value' associated with these realities, 
leading to what sometimes reads as a form of fascism. 
The questions to be asked of Africanists are: what attrac-
tion is there in adopting the image of 'exploitation' as the 
sole relation between Africa and the West? What is gained, 
and in what terms - politically, socially, or logically - by 
removing this 'surplus value' from the equation? A reductive 
vision of this kind does little justice to the plurali .. tic and vi-
brant communities in which people see themselves as mem-
bers of a particular community first and African second. That 
people's spiritual, material and intellectual resources can in-
deed serve as weapons in the resistance against certain con-
temporary hegemonic practices is not to be ignored simply 
because these resources do not conform to some one-dimen-
sional or reductive conception of what the "African-ness" of 
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these ought to be. 
The value of the cultural studies paradigm as bequeathed 
by the Birmingham Center and its various reconstitutions in-
ternationally is its sustained engagement with the reality that 
meanings grow. People's communities and allegiances are 
constantly being reinvented and reconstituted both from within 
and without. In the contemporary world it requires extreme 
measures, moving into the realms of political totalitarianism, 
for any people or nation to insulate themselves completely 
from the rest of the global environment. The experiences of 
states like Burma and apartheid South Africa show fairly con-
clusively that such self-exclusion is unsustainable in the long 
run. Exchanges are always likely to occur through the myriad 
potential encounters they can have with travelers ofaB kinds. 
These can range from academics, politicians, and griots 
(bards); through media, education, and transnational border 
information and trade flows; to the World Bank, UNESCO, 
and the International Monetary Fund. 
What is clear is that meanings and signification as the ba-
sis of culture always require some form of communication 
for them to grow and be made open to negotiation. At the 
core of the topic lies the contradiction that effectively distin-
guishes culture from ideology. Where the concept of culture 
is rooted in the basically conservative notion that identities 
entail some persistence or continuity of communities' char-
acteristics in the face of change, ideologies of all stripes den} 
continuity. What underpins all essentialisms, 'Pan-move-
ments' in Africa, India, among Slavs, Germans, or whatever, 
is the vociferous e1aim that they are not-bourgeois. Yet this 
drives all essentialist approaches to culture into a very indus-
trial and Western political discourse: the eighteenth century 
dichotomy between the city and the country (Williams, 1973, 
p. 347). At the end of the day, all societies which have been 
48 SHEPPERSON AND TOMASELLi 
based on such ideologies have had consequences that are both 
tragic and embarrassing. Tragically, this discourse becomes 
realized in states like Nazi Germany's Nazis, the Khmer 
Rouge's Cambodia, and South Africa's apartheid state. 
Rwanda's ethnic cleansing and Algeria's supposedly religious! 
secular holocaust are other examples where essentialism has 
motivated movements to the limits of humanity. Philosophers 
and cultural studies practitioners celebrate culturally intricate 
hermeneutics, only to end up embarrassingly like Martin 
Heidegger, trapped in a romantic web of agrarian values which 
cut them off from the global city which has evolved over two-
and-a-half centuries. 
All this suggests is that there is another problem facing 
any kind of initiative to determine what it might be that is the 
subject -matter of Cultural Studies in Africa. This is that just 
about every form of philosophical approach other than those 
grounded in anthropological and discourse paradigms that 
Thornton identified, must somehow avoid the stigma associ-
ated with its origins in the traditions claimed by the industri-
alized world. Africans "doing philosophy" in Africa have of-
ten corne to grief because whatever conceptual or logical ap-
proach they take runs into problems of, unsurprisingly, justi-
fying its cultural authenticity and!or its validity within the 
oral discourses of African societies. On the one hand, Bantu 
Philosophy (Tempels, 1952), the document that many accept 
as the original sustained attempt to make philosophic<H sense 
of African people's experiences in Africa, is frequently dis-
missed for its origins as essentially a missionaries' handbook. 
Tempels, for many years active in the missionary field in the 
then Belgian Congo, drew on his understanding of some of 
the local languages to identify certain connecting semantic 
and narrative threads. As a linguistic exercise this was hardly 
earth-shattering; what he did with this, however, was to pro-
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pose that there is a certain hierarchical ontology implicit in 
these languag~s that calls into question the primacy of objec-
tive thought. Leaving aside the controversy that erupted over 
this in Europe, the reception of fempels's proposal among 
Africans has ranged from enthusiastic to outright rejection as 
"ethnocentric". On the other hand, as D.A. Masolo (1994, 
pp. 29-36) points out, not only Tempe!s's categorical schema 
but also much in the logical and metaphysical objections to 
it, are rooted in the specific debates of Continental philoso-
phy at the time of Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre. Many of 
Tempels's followers sought to moderate the perceived 
Aristotelianism or Thomism in his work (Kagam, 1956), while 
others sought to mesh this with wider considerations of Afri-
can religious experience (Mbiti, 1969). Among the dissent-
ers one finds Hegelians, some with Marxist leanings 
(Hountondji, 1983); Oxbridge trained analytical philosophers 
with pragmatist leanings (Appiah, 1986; Wiredu, 1980), and 
a range of alternati ve anthropologically informed approaches 
that, for all that they are sympathetic to the conception of a 
different linguistic structure for African language, seek to 
ground African thought in indigenous epistemology (Hebga, 
1982; Odera Oruka, 1991).l 
However the various schools of thought may approach the 
topic, they all have in common the problem of how African 
people's experiences can be communicated in the context of 
failed development and modernization programs. If we tak~ 
the broad view of communication as semiotically coherent 
exchanges governed by norms and tending to the accomplish-
ment of some end, then D .A. Masolo's endorsement ofK wasi 
Wiredu's gloss on the relation between Africa and modernity 
is highly relevant: 
Admittedly, there is a place for intuition and emotion in life. Life is not all 
logic. But this kind of point is often covertly taken as an excuse for being 
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unmindful oflogic and rational procedures generally; as if from the fact that 
life is not all logic it follows that it is not logic in any part at all. On the 
contrary, it is as true in Africa as anywhere else that logical, mathematical, 
analytical, experimental procedures are essential in the quest for knowledge 
of, and control over, nature and,1herefore, in any endeavor to improve the 
condition of man. Our traditional culture was somewhat wanting in this re-
spect and this is largely responsible for the weaknesses of traditional technol-
ogy, warfare, architecture, medicine, etc. There can be little doubt that many 
of the hardships of traditional life were, and still are traceable to this cause 
(Wiredu, 1980, p. 12, cited in Masolo, 1994, p. 224). 
It is precisely because the forms of communication that 
constitute science, in the sense that logic and its guiding norm 
of truth govern such communication (Peirce, 1998, pp. 58-
59; pp. 85- 86; pp. 130-131; p. 197), are intended to guide 
future generations' capacities to overcome the hardships of 
their inherited life-worlds, that cultural studies must gener-
ally find its roots in the means and norms and logic of such 
communication. The findings of the sciences that Wiredu 
enumerates are themselves semiotically coherent exchanges 
with some indefinite future audiences, some or many mem-
bers of which may seek further to test these findings in the 
context of their inherited life-worlds, which by definition of 
their future reality will not be the same as ours. 
Coming Home: 
Cultural Studies as a Communicational Practice 
• Thus the fundamental subject-matter of cultural studies is 
not the reality oflogical operations, mathematical constructs, 
analytical categories, or experimental methodologies as such, 
but of the logic, constructs, categories and methodologies 
associated with communication with an indefinite audience 
in an indefinite future. Why should this be the case? Well, we 
can begin by returning to Thornton's (2000, p. 38) take on 
the history of the concept: its appearance in Matthew Arnold's 
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definition as a "form of political intervention, albeit in a con-
servative direction." Thornton suggests that Arnold's concep-
tion of culture is aimed at halting "progressive socialist" 
changes during an unsettled period of British politics. The 
problem here is thatAmold's defmition of culture as the "best 
that has been thought and written" is not in itself a definition 
of culture, but of the indicators of cultural accomplishment 
to which a society can appeal in defining its culture. The "best 
that is thought and written" is being defined as a communica-
tion from the past; culture in itself, then, is associated with 
the practice of harnessing these communications practices to 
communicate itself to future generations. 
How does this occur? And to whom is this communication 
directed? Scientific communication is, as Peirce said, always 
addressed "To Whom It May Concern" within an indefinite 
community of inquiry (see Ransdell, 1998). But even if the 
fmdings of cultural studies inquiry is so addressed, this doesn't 
tell practitioners about who is to be addressed in the commu-
nication of culture. "Conservatives" like Matthew Arnold and 
J.S. Mill were stressing that this communicational conduct 
occurs between those who are active members of a society, 
and those seeking to become active in that society. This does 
not mean that there is a specific cultural elite the business of 
which is to pontificate the best that has been thought and 
written. It does mean that the active generations in a society 
must communicate with the new generations in ways tHat 
ensure that the ends of this communication become realized 
in conduct that is directed toward further ends that are guided 
by the norms of truth, goodness and beauty. This is, despite 
being all that culture is about, the task upon which societies 
succeeded or failed in modernity. As the social and political 
boundaries of modernity shift because of the expansion of 
communication limits because of developing technologies, 
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so the guiding norms of truth, goodness and beauty, the great 
regulative ideas of philosophy, must take account of ends that 
transcend the national ends, the being-British of early cul-
tural studies, in order to dis6em ends that accommodate hu-
manity globally. The intended recipients of culture now in-
habit a globe, and cultural studies must recognize that one 
can only be-National consequent to one's being-human. 
The irony of all this is that just when Africa recovered the 
voice that enabled its peoples to add their claims to be-Afri-
can alongside all the other claims, of those experienced at 
being-British, French,American, and so on, so the social and 
political structures that lent legitimacy to these claims have 
become fuzzy, amorphous, and porous. Cultural studies in 
Africa, therefore, must strive to communicate just this, that it 
is offering for review and criticism the findings of cultural 
inquiry in Africa and should no longer strive toward the insu-
larity of nationalized cultural studies elsewhere. The com-
municational task is to open the way for communicating about 
what it means to enable new generations to conduct them-
selves under the guidance of ends defined by globally recog-
nizable norms of Truth, Goodness and Beauty. Logicians, ethi-
cists and aesthetic specialists can communicate about the 
purport of these value ideas, but they are not themselves the 
subject-matter of cultural studies. The principal subject-mat-
ter of cultural studies is communicating about the communi-
cation of accomplishing forms of conduct that will be-guided, 
however minimally, by these kinds of norms. 
Cultural studies as communication is, in other words, a 
form of pragmatism. From African thinkers like Masolo (1994, 
p. 207) the field can build on a conception of cognition that 
includes the understanding that "to know is to apprehend the 
future as qualified by values" which become realized in the 
conduct of individuals and communities. This way of under-
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standing the results of inquiry is, as Masolo (1994, p. 207) 
notes about Wiredu, "in the control it gives us, through ap-
propriate action, over the quality of our future experience." 
To some extent, then, the ends o(culture and the ends of the 
inquiry of cultural studies overlap. But the immediate need 
to develop a new generation's endowments into talents (Heller, 
1987, pp. 302-315) involves a different objective to that of 
the communication associated with cultural studies inquiry. 
The latter is guided by the abstract norms oflogic, ethics and 
aesthetics (Peirce, 1998, pp. 371-397) with a view to an end 
that is always only potentially present but none the less con-
ceivable in the present. The object of the former is embodied 
in ends that are more actual, in the form of the members of 
the generation under development, and the logic, ethics and 
aesthetics of this conduct are subject to the contextual needs 
of the particular relationship. 
This recalls the scholastic distinction between formal and 
practical logic (logica docens and logica utens), where 
Masolo's (1994, p. 210) reminder is therefore applicable: 
The all-important point that needs to be noted is that problems of contempo-
rary society must he dealt with in accordance with contemporary procedures 
of knowledge. In our view, this kind ofreasoning embodies relativism. Fur-
thennore, there is nothing incompatible about holding a relativist thesis in 
regard to the instrumentalist role of reason while also holding to a rigid 
objectivist or realist thesis in the areas of science. The combination of the 
two, in any case, makes the world of experience. • 
Masolo comes close to endorsing a sort of pragmatism here, 
even if there is a somewhat degenerate realpolitik quality 
about it. But there is another way of looking at how the ca-
pacity to use the technologies Masolo identifies, also prag-
matic, but rooted more in the logic of things and the norms 
that precede logic. Technologies of war and administration 
do not work in the absence of some element of their users' 
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understanding being rooted in the practical ends attainable 
by means of the embodiments of these technologies, whether 
as weapons or as institutions. These endure beyond the mor-
tal span of their users, and rn many respects it is their reality 
as means that determines what constitutes the right and wrong 
way of reaching the ends that their use can accomplish. If 
one generalizes a bit from this, we begin to tread on the ground 
laid by Peirce (1839-1914) with his version of scholastic re-
alism, meshed with the mild nominalism of the sciences in 
the logical doctrine he called pragmaticism. 
Culture and the Logic oflnstitutions: 
A Different Semiotic Exchange 
In general, the cultural studies field has tended to take it 
more or less for granted that its tradition is based on the choices 
available between existing philosophical approaches. In many 
ways, cultural studies practitioners recognize that their field, 
as a specialized form of inquiry, must draw on the resources 
of philosophy while not in itself producing texts or perform-
ing philosophical analysis, criticism, or synthesis. But the 
resources available are not quite as restricted as Thornton 
makes them out to be. When Tempels drew on scholastic con-
ceptions of reality to develop his system of African or Bantu 
categories, he drew on a tradition that many are turning to in 
an effort to break the sterility of the analytic verSllS herme-
neutic options that seem to dominate the resources cultural 
studies draws upon. Augustine Shutte (1993) draws on the 
tradition of Teilhard de Chardin to make the case that Neo-
Thomism provides the most relevant basis for philosophical 
inquiry in Africa. This position has considerable merit, pre-
cisely on account of its cognitive affinity with Tempels' ap-
proach. It does open up the possibility of simply redrawing 
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the battle-lines between traditions that we have already noted. 
What sets the pragmaticist version of neo-scholasticism apart, 
however, is that it uses a development of the long-neglected 
realism of Duns Scotus not only to simplifY the system of 
logical categories, but also to propose and defend a concep-
tion of reality that enables a more scientifically acceptable 
logic for critical inquiry in the cultural studies mold. 
Peirce developed an approach to logic that a century after 
his death still yields rich ore for the inquirer into topics based 
on what the critical philosophy tradition calls value-rational 
reasoning. What the conception of culture as a form of com-
munication directed at developing new generations' endow-
ments into talents permits, is to consider just what is beauti-
ful and good about the potential conduct ofthese generations 
in the context of conceivable forms oflife in a changing world. 
For the ends of cultural studies inquiry, the proposal that the 
ends of culture are embodied in the future generations' de-
velopment of endowments into talents adds a further dimen-
sion to Peirce's conception of truth. In this conception, the 
plurality of conceivable truth contexts permit different kinds 
of truths: 
... the different kinds of sciences deal with different kinds of truth; math-
ematical truth is one thing, ethical truth is another, the actually existing state 
of the universe is a third; but all these different conceptions have in common 
something very marked and clear. We all hope that the different scientific 
inquiries in which we are severally engaged are ultimately going to lea~ to 
some definitely established conclusion, which conclusion we endeavor to 
anticipate in some measure. Agreement with that ultimate proposition that 
we look forward to, agreement with that, whatever it may turn out to be, is 
the scientific truth (Peirce, 1998, p. 87 - emphasis added). 
In some measure this emphasis on truth as something we 
reach through inquiry, whatever it may turn out to be, can 
restore to cultural studies, in Africa and globally, the critical 
I 
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impetus that marked the socialist -progressive agenda of the 
field's first British incarnation. The truths about the present, 
ethical, mathematical, the state of the universe, and cultur-
ally, are only part of the truths that inquiry ultimately may 
reveal, no matter how unexpected. That many truths in the 
present are indeed true can be established by research; that 
they could change because of conditions yet to come about in 
the future is where the import of social and cultural inquiry is 
relevant. 
We build our institutions on the understanding that the ends 
ofthese institutions will meet needs arising from the accom-
plishment of other ends. It is far too apparent that what we 
take to be understood sufficiently well at present in our so-
cial and cultural institutional environment, can in fact fail to 
meet the needs of generations yet to come. Indeed, the dimi-
nution of the national idea is a stark demonstration that the 
truths about the human condition that made the national idea 
work a few centuries ago have become insufficient to ground 
social and cultural institutions, because of the persistence of 
institutions as sites of class interest. Other truths not antici-
pated in the original movement to institutionalization have 
emerged, and these have expanded the reality of the human 
condition as a result. That is indeed just what cultural studies 
originally tried to address: the failure of institutional trans-
formation to reduce the influence of class interest in the com-
munication practices that a generation of Labor Socialists had 
hoped would have as their end a generation less class-divided 
than in the past. The semiotic exchange between generations 
failed, because, as Williams (\965, p. 101) noted, there are 
always at least three generations present in any social group-
ing. The middle generation may have held the new 
generation's conduct close to its collective heart, but it failed 
to reconcile this with not only the generation that came be- . 
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fore, but with the institutional interests that had grown as that 
earlier generation grew into its forms of conduct and became 
familiar and competent with actinl;l within these forms of con-
duct. 
Such a situation is susceptible to analysis in terms of po-
litical economy; because of the relations of power associated 
with institutions generally. There is indeed a vocal branch of 
cultural studies that keeps this form of inquiry alive (see 
Sparks, 2000; Mosco, 1996). But it is still at the end of the 
day a question of how the incumbent generations in the so-
cial institutions, governmental, economic, academic, and sym-
bolic, succeed in making these serve as media for communi-
cating across generations. At this level, there is a synergy 
between cultural studies inquiry and communications inquiry 
that goes beyond simply analyzing messages, or establishing 
lines of dissemination to audiences. What sort of inquiry will 
this entail? We close with some possible forms of cultural 
studies inquiry that will use its existing strengths in combi-
nation with the logic of communication to restore the pro-
gressive impulse of its early forms. 
Cultural Studies Inquiry in Post-National Africa 
Crucial to the unfolding of cultural studies (plural) in Af-
rica will be the philosophical difficulty inherent in, and the 
rhetorical force required for, remaking traditional concepts 
and understanding African societies as being as dynamic as 
are those in highly industrialized societies. Our conclusion 
will glance at one such project, the much-publicized "Afri-
can Renaissance." First introduced as a rhetorical term by 
Nelson Mandela in 1994, this idea has become a contested 
and controversial discursive site. Aside from the many ways 
that one can reconstitute the retrospective conception of"Re-
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naissance" in its application to European history, the varie-
gated participants in the discourse have all brought their own 
more or less idiosyncra!ic conceptions of" Africa" to the table. 
It goes almost without saying that every one of them has some 
gloss on just what it is about "African Culture" that must be 
the founding principle for any prospective renaissance (see 
contributions to Makgoba, 1999). This kind of debate tends 
toward the nominalistic, whereas the pragmatism of Masolo, 
Wiredu and Peirce is based on a form of realism. Where real-
ism approaches its subject matters in a "world consisting of 
Universals into which Singulars are introduced (come into 
being and pass away)," nominalism of the scholastic persua-
sion considers a "world of Singulars into which Generals are 
introduced" (Charles Rudder, posting to Peirce discussion 
forum, June 1,2001). 
Many practitioners in the global cultural studies endeavor 
tend to consider cultures as singulars into the multiplex and 
chaotic presence of which it is their end to introduce what-
ever General Terms they can agree upon to reduce the mani-
fold of singulars to some kind of unity. This is in part the 
inheritance of post-Deweyan pragmatists like Richard Rorty 
(1980) and David Goldberg (1993), but also of both the 
Nietzschean tradition that Thornton identifies, and the phi-
losophies of science that follow from the work of Paul 
Feyerabend (1975) and Thomas Kuhn (1970). What we will 
propose, instead, is that conceptually the subject-matter of 
cultural studies is a real general operative in the (human) uni-
verse into which instances of cultural phenomena are intro-
duced. We have already suggested that this really-operative 
general concept is that which governs particular instances of 
communication between generations, and the general con-
duct of cultural institutions and conduct that determine the 
development of new generations' endowments into talents. 
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In closing we will outline ways in which we think we might 
fulfil our responsibility for supporting this assertion in the 
communicative forum that we believe should constitute the 
scientific community of cultural studies inquiry. We will use 
the particular instance of the African Renaissance as our ex-
emplar. 
In this case the singular terms are "in Africa" and "a Re-
naissance," and these are largely determined symbols with a 
number of already fixed interpretations arising from differ-
ent singular contexts. The general term that defines our sub-
ject-matter has cognate predications like "is African," "is 
cultural," or "is progressive." Decisively, there is also the 
particular context formed by the relationships between Afri-
can conditions and those of others in the global environment. 
This forms the ethical normative framework within which 
cultural studies can conceive of the conduct that will have 
the outcome of removing the doubts that are expressed about 
the relationship between Africa and the rest of the globe, how-
ever this may turn out to be. One way to begin exploring this 
in terms of asserting some hypothesis which will be testable 
in practice, is to begin from some situation where people are 
already asserting things about these relations, or about their 
doubts, or both, in a context of communicative conduct. We 
will introduce the particular instance of a session on "Resist-
ing and contesting media globalization in the African con-
text," part of the SankofaAfrican Renaissance Conference in 
Durban, South Africa, March-April 2001. 
Although the original participants listed for the session 
panel comprised six persons from the media, the academy 
and civil society, the actual event only saw three panelists: 
Peter Davis, editor of the Durban Sunday Tribune newspa-
per; Xolela Mangcu of the Steve Biko Foundation and the 
University of the Witwatersrand, and Arnold Shepperson of 
60 SHEPPERSON AND TOMASELLI 
the University of Nata!. However, this turned out to be a case 
ofless-is-more, in that participants had more time to speak to 
their papers and greater room for discussion thereafter. Al-
most the first thing the presenters realized was that the ses-
sion theme was way too broad, in that three people proposing 
means of contesting and resisting globalization was likely to 
have little more effect than spitting into the wind. After de-
ciding that 'responding to media globalization' was some-
what less pretentious, and having decided on the order of pre-
sentation, the participants spoke to their respective papers. 
Peter Davis based his presentation on the journalism of 
the Sophiatown journalists of the 1940s and 1950s, with an 
emphasis on how the potential for people to transcend their 
legislated and institutional racial separation during this pe-
riod exemplified the Zulu conception of ubuntu (see above). 
Arnold Shepperson stressed the need for promoters of 
projects like the African Renaissance to avoid essentialist con-
ceptions of culture, shifting their grasp of the general con-
ceptual status of the term from that of being a problem, to 
that of being a potential solution. The means for accomplish-
ing this was, as we have conceptualized it above, to treat cul-
tural issues on the basis of the general realities of developing 
new generations' endowments into talents suited to a world 
conceivably different from the one of the present. 
Finally, Xolela Mangcu presented a summary of develop-
ment solutions in which alternative forms of institlltionaliza-
tion made it possible for a population to enjoy real improve-
ments in their quality oflife with minimal national state-style 
development by command. Using the example the Indian state 
of South Kerala, he proposed similar options for some of the 
more marginalized areas of Africa. 
Individually, these presentations would have amounted to 
little more than rehashes of themes that reflected the present-
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ers' research or professional concerns. In that particular fo-
rum, however, and given the order of presentation, the dis-
cussion saw the ideas developed in the presentations com-
bine into a series of proposals that'made the approach to me-
dia globalization look rather less daunting than the original 
session theme had made them appear. At the end of the pre-
sentations it was clear that there was a way of viewing ubuntu 
as a quality of human relations applicable in many contexts 
(in the forms of solidarity, nationalism, ideological partisan-
ship, and so on). The concept of culture, based in developing 
endowments into talents, has an end in action that seeks to 
realize in people's conduct whatever qualities an idea like 
ubuntu might assert to be admirable in human relationships. 
Finally the practices of institutions that deploy such talents 
in the perpetuation of both the qualities they embody and the 
ends after which they strive, are a logical or determinate out-
come that has some more or less determinate influence on 
the ways a community or group or class or nation will con-
duct itself. In short, ubuntu is an aesthetic conception of what 
constitutes the admirable in human relations; culture is the 
ethical framework within which communities embody these 
qualities in the talents that provide the base of their actions; 
and institutions are the means of communicating these prior 
norms to future generations. Institutions without ethics are 
just paper-shuffling exercises; ethics without an aesthetic rhe-
torical basis is merely sophistry; the point is that any institu~ 
tion is presupposed by a culture, any culture is presupposed 
by an aesthetic of human relations. As Peirce came to see the 
general relationship: there is a presuppositional order of nor-
mative sciences such that logic is presupposed by both ethics 
and aesthetics; but ethics is presupposed only by aesthetics. 
There is no normative science that is presupposed by aesthet-
ics, the latter being grounded in the ways that a community 
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describes the phenomenon of the human condition (Peirce, 
1998, pp. 196-207). 
In the conclusions presented to the closing plenary of the 
conference, the session participants effectively recommended 
the foregoing as the conceptual strategy on the grounds of 
which policy for media literacy and literacy education, as in-
stitutional action, could in future be developed. This was, 
needless to say, but one set of recommendations among a 
plethora of others, some of which hardly went beyond 
sloganeering, while others obviously reflected considerably 
more thought in their composition. The main thing, from the 
point of view of our article, is that the conceptualization of 
the much-abused term ubuntu was in this instance given an 
unambiguous conceptual grounding. What had been, as noted 
briefly above, one of those portmanteau words that served 
the rhetoric of whatever ideology had mobilized it, now took 
on the clear role of an African aesthetic in the complex of 
global relationships. Further, the concept of culture also took 
on an unambiguous ground in the general class of practices, 
action and conduct that one associates with the development 
of endowments into talents. Finally, the recommendations 
made it clear that media are institutions, and not messages. 
These institutions can range from local or community news-
papers or radio stations, to multinational titles in print or elec-
tronic form; but they remain institutions the purpose of which 
is to organize semiotic exchange such that the relevant com- . 
munication may occur. 
Conclusion: Cultural Studies 
and the Ethics of Communication 
The more general applicability of this anecdotal descrip-
tion of how cultural studies works comes from engaging the 
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kinds of concerns that Raymond Williams raised (1989). Pe-
culiarly, by beginning with Masolo's and Wiredu's broader 
pragmatic approach based in Dewey, and extending this with 
Peirce's systematic and logical treatment (William James cred-
its Peirce with coining the term "pragmatism" in the 1870s), 
cultural studies becomes far less of a "vague and baggy mon-
ster." Precisely as Williams suggested, the more precise basis 
of the concept of culture possible within pragmatism indeed 
pennits cultural studies to be conceived as Williams thought 
it could be, "as media studies, community sociology, popular 
fiction or popular music" and so on. Yet the pragmatic con-
ception of culture as the concern with development of en-
dowments into talents gives focus to each of these topical 
branches without the tendency for one to become identified 
with or collapsed into all the others. 
Because the idea of inquiry in these fields is also a specifi-
cally communicational practice, a semiotic addressed to an 
indefinite "to whom it may concern" (see Ransdell, 1998; 
Peirce, 1998,390-391) in a future beyond anybody's control, 
findings in specific topical fields can become meaningful 
through this communication. Cultural studies has, to some 
extent, drawn upon the communications studies tradition in-
stitutionally (Hardt, 1993; but see also Maras, 1998). But 
Williams' point was not that cultural studies was "vague and 
baggy" as a field of study; instead, he was more concerned 
about the difference between a teacher of a subject and all 
inquirer into a problem, for which the relevant intellectual 
discipline for its explication is not yet established. In less 
clumsy terms: Williams was concerned that what passed for 
cultural studies as a course for undergraduates had not as yet 
clearly defined what research program provided its teaching 
material. It must be remembered that the original BCCCS 
was a graduate studies and research unit, with the explosion 
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of undergraduate cultural studies courses arriving on the scene 
only after those first research students had taken their skills 
elsewhere. It is also worth remembering further that the skills 
those original students brought to BCCCS had been learned 
not in "inter-disciplinary" undergraduate programs, but in 
specific disciplines like History, Sociology, Anthropology, 
Literature, and so on. It was not the disciplines that drove 
their research, but the subject-matter. Thus Williams' con-
cern was that the field had become carried away with the 
communication between practitioners of the study'S multiple 
self-descriptions, at the expense of dealing with an identifi-
able subject-matter that would add value to the humanities as 
they go forward. 
To recall Peirce: science is essentially the practice of com-
municating what one learns from experience to those who in 
an indefinite context of reception will be able to understand 
these findings under different kinds of experience. The study 
of communication as a practice, therefore, is crucial not just 
to African cultural studies: it is the very essence of any cul-
tural studies. In the globalizing environment of multinational 
capital with its niche-marketed commodities, neo-monopo-
listic investment strategies, and mobile capitalization poli-
cies, it is even more important that cultural studies look be-
yond the immediate identities of those marginalized by these 
developments. The field must, as a form of communication, 
look to whom its messages will reach when the conseq\lences 
of all these developments become more evident. Already, 
African scholars like Masolo and Wiredu have tapped into 
the pragmatic tradition from the point of view of how moder-
nity has impacted on specific forms of African life. Cultural 
studies must draw on this not to withdraw the African experi-
ence from that of the global cultural environment, but to com-
municate with that audience so that the people of Africa can 
CULTURAL STUDIES AND AFRICA 65 
take their rightful place in the world after the aberrations of 
imperialism, neo-colonialism and globalization. 
To conclude, there is a clear need for cultural studies to 
clarify what it is that it is communicating about to its audi-
ence in future generations. This entails three imperatives: 
1) clarifying its subject-matter, that which guides its in-
quiry; . 
2) interpellating the community of inquiry to whom in-
quirers will address their findings; and 
3) developing and reviewing the criteria whereby the cul-
tural dimension of reality is conceived 
as a subject-matter. 
First, we have already proposed that the subject-matter of 
cultural studies is based in the practical business of develop-
ing endowments into talents. This is not really a new thing, 
but simply a reminder that the very word, culture, has as its 
principal etymological root the sense of looking-after, 
nurturance and living-in-a-place that is essential to every hu-
man being's coming to have an identity in the first place. But 
the historical trend towards institutionalizing this business 
means that the objects of this subject-matter cannot exclude 
precisely these institutions. This, we have noted, is a study 
proper to the methods and categories of political economy, 
but shifted towards the consequences of institutional action~ 
on the future conduct of new generations in general, and not 
purely on class-based or ethnically-defined units. Second, we 
suggested that the community of inquiry be conceived 
globally and not continentally or in terms of individual cul-
tural entities. This is necessary because global conditions re-
• quire global approaches, even to the extent of conceiving one's 
conditions as part of a global context. The community 
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of inquiry with which the contemporary cultural studies prac-
titioner must seek to communicate has to include as much of 
the conceivable community of inquirers who may need to 
address some cultural aspect 6ftheir su~ect-matter. This leads 
to the third dimension of the communicational aspect of cul-
tural studies: it can be all too easy to identify every form of 
institutional conduct with the development of endowments 
into talents. Thus the criteria for marking-off what is "cul-
tural" and what is not must not be so "loose and baggy" as to 
leave cultural studies without definite topical communica-
tions content. At the same time, the criteria should neverthe-
less be flexible enough so that practitioners do not get taken 
by surprise every time new developments in technology, 
media, or ideology invite new generations to adopt forms of 
conduct that privilege new kinds of talents. 
This means, in effect, that cultural studies must recover its 
early research imperative. There must be a greater emphasis 
not just on graduate study, but on the meshing of practitio-
ners from the various human and social sciences so their spe-
cific skills can be brought to bear on the basic subject-matter: 
the institutional conduct of developing endowments into tal-
ents. This should not be designed as an exercise in reinforc-
ing cultural studies as a sort of "megadiscipline" (Maras, 
1998), but to expand the capacity of historically established 
disciplines to communicate more effectively with their com-
munities of inquiry. African cultural studies can beginby tak-
ing a critical look at just how some of the "enchanting dark-
ness" discourse (Hickey & Wylie, 1993) has perhaps identi-
fied communities' responses to their marginalization by im-
perialism and neo-colonialism, with conduct that somehow 
represents an essentialist difference between these commu-
nities and similar communities elsewhere. 
For example, when cultural studies inquires into distinc-
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tions between oral and written cultures, a crucial part ofthese 
investigations into Africa require a related reconceptualization 
of the role of orality in the written philosophical and literary 
traditions of the West. This reconceptualization is necessary 
to confront the collapse of 'orality' as a concept into the Ro-
mantic city-country trap of the historically industrialized 
world. We need to remember that the greatest reactionary 
populists like Hitler, Idi Amin, Pol Pot and others exploited 
the 'authenticity' of the spoken word to destroy any possibil-
ity for democracy in their worlds. Authenticity is legitimated 
by museums, the printed word, and tourism, amongst other 
circulatory symbolic mechanisms. The Western remaking of 
oral and on-site culture into writing, museum exhibits and 
nationalized forms, and of the preservation (or lack of it) of 
oral traditions in modem frameworks, is a recurring gripe 
amongst Africans. 
What cultural studies has to remember is that the radical 
origins of the field in Birmingham during the 1950s was an 
, attempt to recover democracy. The choice of socialism as the 
" vehicle for this has not proven to be as fruitful as seemed 
, , apparent at the time. Studies of and in Africa have provided a 
timely reminder that 'socialism' does not necessarily consti-
, , lute a globally relevant ground for democracy. There are dy-
namic and indeterminate cultural pathways to the political 
" value of freedom, and cultural studies have not yet absorbed 
, 'the fundamental stasis associated with any form of ideology: 
getting to grips with what it is the "culture" to which 
" cultural studies refers when it communicates with itself and 
"()ther fields of inquiry, is a step that can get both cultural stud-
ies as subject-matter, and as a body of communicating in-
quirers, onto relevant tracks for the futures that globalization 
has made possible. 
In an important respect this brings us back to Masilela's 
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call with which we opened this article. The "nativization" of 
cultural studies must take into account not only the factors of 
"being-native" in Africa, but also those factors that make all 
Africans "native" in a g\obaf context. Whatever the present 
active generations are communicating to their successors, 
cultural studies in Africa must consider the trajectories pos-
sible as a consequence of how this communication is institu-
tionalized. Will the ideas, values and ends communicated 
under the present conditions not "nativize" succeeding gen-
erations into the very sub-altemity and marginality that glo-
balization exploits so effectively in perpetuating transnational 
capital and its multilateral enforcement institutions? What can 
cultural studies learn from these institutions' practices and 
conditions to enhance the democratic challenge to globaliza-
tion? How can institutions that are representative find "added 
value" from cultural studies practitioners' inquiry into these 
topics in Africa? How, in short, do such findings communi-
cate in a way that empowers people to take leadership of glo-
bal trends in ways that represent their needs, instead of con-
serving the interest of the privileged few? That is the com-
municational task that understanding the subject-matter of 
cultural studies can enhance. 
Arnold Shepperson is a Researcher at the Centre for Cul-
tural and Media Studies, University of Natal, Durban. South 
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We have based our classification ofphilosophicaJ approaches in Africa loosely 
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on that of Henry Odera Oruka (Masolo, 1994, pp. 233-234). Odera OTUka basi-
cally classifies philosophy in Africa as I) ethnophilosophy, based on Tempels, 
Kagame, Griaule, amongst others; 2) professional philosophy, including those 
who teach and write in the academy, including Odera Oruka himself, on the basis 
offonnal training in the field; 3) the modem political and ideological philoso-
phers like Leopold Senghor, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, amongst others; 
and finally, 4) Odera OTUka identifies what he calls Afiican philosophical sagac-
ity', "the theory of which is based on the epistemological value of wisdom or 
sagacity" (Masolo, 1994, p. 234). 
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